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INTRODUCTION 
Age, rather than death, has come to define the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence.1  In three decisions over the last nine years, the 
Court has significantly altered the criminal sentencing landscape by doling 
out constitutional, categorical discounts on capital and noncapital 
punishment for those who had not yet celebrated their eighteenth birthdays 
at the time of their crimes.2  The Court rejected capital punishment for those 
under eighteen,3 then life without parole in nonhomicide cases,4 and most 
recently, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory 
life without parole sentences.5  Each decision has turned on attributes, or 
factors, inherent in youth that the Court has found make those under 
eighteen less culpable for their crimes under the Eighth Amendment.6  They 
 
1 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (“So if . . . death is different, 
children are different too . . . .  [I]t is no surprise that the law relating to society’s harshest 
punishments recognizes such a distinction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Mary Berkheiser, Death Is Not So Different After All: Graham v. Florida and the Court’s 
‘Kids Are Different’ Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 36 VT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2011) 
(describing how the Court’s approach in Graham v. Florida “unceremoniously demolished 
the Hadrian’s Wall that has separated its ‘death is different’ jurisprudence from non-capital 
sentencing review since 1972” and, in its place, “fortified an expansive ‘kids are different’ 
jurisprudence”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine in: The 
Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth 
Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 81 (2010) (“Justice 
Kennedy [in Graham] thus managed to transform what had looked like a capital versus 
noncapital line, the application of which rendered noncapital challenges essentially hopeless, 
into a categorical rule versus individual sentence line . . . .”). 
2 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  Each of these decisions followed Atkins v. Virginia, which 
held executing mentally retarded criminals to be cruel and unusual punishment due to the 
offenders’ reduced capacity and the executions’ failure to serve social justifications 
recognized for the death penalty.  See 536 U.S. 304, 318–21 (2002). 
3 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
4 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
5 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  The Court considered Miller along with 
Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9647), which also presented the question 
of whether a juvenile’s sentence of life without parole violated the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460–62. 
6 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 
569–70). 
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include offenders’ (1) lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, (2) vulnerability to negative influences and limited control 
over their environment, and (3) lack of characters that can be rehabilitated.7 
These factors have not been surmised simply from precedent or 
common sense.  Rather, the Court has relied on scientific and sociological 
studies to support its finding that these three characteristics are inherent 
among those under eighteen,8 reduce that group’s culpability, and 
accordingly reduce the punishments that society can justly impose.9  But the 
Court’s reliance on such evidence overextends its usefulness.  
Neuroscientific and psychological data on which the Court has relied does 
not identify a bright-line age at which these three factors no longer lessen 
culpability.10  Their resulting impact on penological justifications 
supporting legitimate punishment, which have also been central to the 
Court’s holdings, similarly does not hinge on an offender having a 
particular number of candles on his birthday cake.  The Court itself has 
previously recognized the shallow truth of age, holding youth to be “more 
than a chronological fact” and instead “a time and condition of life when a 
person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological 
damage.”11  Still, since Roper v. Simmons, the Court has resolved to 
categorically and increasingly mitigate punishment based on youthfulness 
via the Eighth Amendment only when offenders are under eighteen.  While 
 
7 Id.  The Court Bellotti v. Baird had posited a similar but distinguishable list of reasons 
for treating children differently from adults, including: (1) “the peculiar vulnerability of 
children,” (2) “their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner,” and 
(3) “the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”  See 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) 
(concerning a law restricting the right of a minor to obtain an abortion). 
8 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
9 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464–65; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026, 2034; Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 569, 570, 578. 
10 A brief offering up scientific evidence for the Court, for example, recognized its own 
limitations.  See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 6 n.3, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621) 
(“[S]cience cannot, of course, draw bright lines precisely demarcating the boundaries 
between childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.”); see also Sara B. Johnson et al., 
Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in 
Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 218 (2009) (“[N]euroimaging 
studies do not allow a chronologic cut-point for behavioral or cognitive maturity at either the 
individual or population level.”).  For further discussion, see infra Part II.A. 
11 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982).  For this reason, the Court 
required lower courts to also consider “the background and mental and emotional 
development of a youthful defendant.”  Id. at 116. 
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the Court in Roper acknowledged and discounted the limitations of its 
bright-line rule,12 the Miller Court did not address the issue. 
This Comment aims to seize on the Miller Court’s silence and 
demonstrate the inequity in drawing a bright line at eighteen for considering 
youthfulness in mitigating punishment under the Court’s logic.  Given both 
the scientific impossibility of identifying a precise age at which 
characteristics of youthfulness cease, and the Court’s repeated recognition 
that these very factors impact culpability and preclude just punishment,13 
the current approach cannot stand.  Instead, this Comment argues that if the 
way to address the increasingly punitive orientation of criminal justice 
remains one of protecting youthful defendants through the Eighth 
Amendment, then the same consideration of youthfulness that has been 
deemed constitutionally relevant for those under eighteen must also be 
available for equally youthful14 defendants over eighteen to assert when 
they face equally harsh and irrevocable sentences. 
While considerable literature discusses sentencing policy for young 
offenders, this Comment focuses on the Supreme Court’s trio of categorical 
decisions to examine the justifications for a bright-line rule and, ultimately, 
to lend support for defendants’ abilities to seek out the mitigating force of 
youthfulness up to age twenty-five.  By continuing to categorically exclude 
those over eighteen in homage to society’s traditional demarcation point of 
adulthood, the Court loses sight of the exceptionality of criminal 
punishment compared to other rights-allocating areas of the law, such as 
voting.  Furthermore, setting a bright line at eighteen unjustly disregards 
offenders over eighteen who, in many instances, would likewise be deemed 
less responsible under the scheme of justifications the Court has set forth. 
Following this Introduction, Part I of this Comment provides 
background regarding the relationship between youthfulness and 
culpability.  First, it sketches its historical foundations, describing both the 
 
12 In Roper, the Court reasoned that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults 
do not disappear when an individual turns 18,” but “[t]he age of 18 is the point where society 
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”  543 U.S. at 574. 
13 In Miller, the Court articulated its most recent affirmation that the factors are of 
central import for sentencing judges and juries to consider in arriving at appropriate, 
proportional punishment.  See 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
14 This Comment uses the term “youthful” to describe those who possess the 
characteristics that the Court has relied on in Roper, Graham, and Miller to mitigate 
punishment.  In addition, whereas other writers have opted to distinguish between “children” 
and “adults,” using the age of eighteen as a boundary, this Comment adopts the terms 
“youth” and “young people” to describe those individuals who are no longer children and not 
yet fully functioning adults.  Kenneth Keniston referred to the period between adolescence 
and adulthood as “youth” in 1970.  Kenneth Keniston, Youth: A “New” Stage of Life, 39 
AM. SCHOLAR 631, 635 (1970).  Scholars today continue to redefine this transitional period.  
See infra Part II.A. 
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early common law infancy defense and the rise and fall of the rehabilitative 
juvenile justice model.  Second, it describes the biological underpinnings of 
youthfulness that have been documented through psychological and 
neuroscientific study.  Third, it shows how the Supreme Court has given 
this evidence Eighth Amendment significance. 
Part II then raises three key issues with the Court’s bright line at 
eighteen.  It highlights the lack of scientific support for a categorical line, 
describes the Court’s improper comparison to other rights-allocating areas 
of the law, and demonstrates how penological justifications for punishment 
can be similarly undermined for youthful defendants over eighteen. 
Finally, Part III argues that the Court should make the mitigating effect 
of youthfulness available to youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-five by recasting its categorical line as a presumption.  Under 
such a scheme, defendants up to eighteen years old would be irrebuttably 
presumed youthful, while defendants between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five could seek to show that they meet the Court’s “youthful” 
criterion and likewise deserve protection from irrevocable sentences. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. CENTURIES OF RECOGNIZING THE IMPACT OF YOUTHFULNESS ON 
CULPABILITY 
The correlative relationship between youthfulness and culpability has 
long been recognized through the concept of infancy.15  By the seventeenth 
century, English common law held that children under the age of seven 
could not be punished for any crime.16  Those aged seven and under were 
irrebuttably presumed to lack the mental capacity to form the criminal 
intent necessary for justly imposing punishment.17  While individuals 
 
15 For an informative discussion of the origins of the infancy defense, see Francis Bowes 
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1007–10 (1932). 
16 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *22–23; 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE 
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 27 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 1800) (1736).  English law 
regarding age and criminal responsibility borrowed from Roman civil law, which divided 
“minors”—generally those under age twenty-one or twenty-five—into general stages, such 
as infantia (birth until age seven), pueritia proxima (seven to fourteen), and pubertas (above 
age fourteen).  See 1 HALE, supra, at 16–19.  Ecclesiastical courts and Roman civil courts 
had previously established seven as “the age of reason,” finding it to be the age at which a 
child could lose innocence, be guilty of sin, and be criminally liable for his behavior.  See 
MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN 36–37 (2006). 
17 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 27–28; see also 
EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4 (5th ed. 
1671) (noting that the principal end of punishment, deterrence, is not served when infants are 
below the “age of discretion”). 
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between ages seven and thirteen were additionally presumed incapable of 
forming that intent,18 proof that the child knew his act was wrong could 
rebut the presumption.19  After the U.S. Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
common law rebuttable presumption of incapacity to commit felonies for 
youth between ages seven and thirteen remained in force, but “adult” 
punishments, such as execution, could theoretically be imposed on anyone 
over the age of seven.20 
These gradations based on age reflected the importance of a guilty 
conscience for criminal punishment.  To constitute a complete crime, 
“cognizable by human laws,” Blackstone wrote, “there must be, first, a 
vicious will; and secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious 
will.”21  If a jury confronted a defendant incapable of committing a felony, 
Sir Matthew Hale advised that it could find that he committed the act but 
was not of sound mind, or that he could not discern between good and 
evil.22  Determining culpability in this way reflected the understanding that 
developmental differences prevented very young offenders from forming 
criminal intent.23  When offenders then passed the minimum threshold of 
competence, their diminished responsibility could still render them less 
culpable.24  Defendants aged seven to fourteen were presumed to possess a 
natural incapacity to be guilty of crimes, which the state could rebut upon 
 
18 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 26–27 (noting an 
even greater presumption for those under twelve).  
19 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; CORRIERO, supra note 16, at 37.  While the 
rebuttable presumption recognized that some children matured more quickly than others, it 
also served the policy interest of punishing children who committed particularly atrocious 
acts, regardless of their immaturity.  See CORRIERO, supra note 16, at 37. 
20 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); see also Julian W. Mack, The Chancery 
Procedure in the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT 310, 310 (Jane 
Addams ed., 1925); Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply 
the Want of Years, 86 TUL. L. REV. 309, 316 (2011); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for 
Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While 
Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 616 (1983) (“Seven children were executed 
prior to 1800 and 95 prior to 1900, the youngest aged ten years.”). 
21 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *21 (“[A]n unwarrantable act without a vicious will 
is no crime at all.”); see also 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 38 (“[I]t is the will and intention, that 
regularly is required, as well as the act and event, to make [an] offense capital.”). 
22 See 1 HALE, supra note 16, at 27. 
23 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, 
and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 100 (1997). 
24 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 55–56, 57 (2005) (“[E]ven 
after a youth passes the minimum threshold of competence that leads to a finding of capacity 
to commit crimes, the barely competent youth is not as culpable and therefore not as 
deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult offender.”); Lerner, 
supra note 20, at 317. 
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individualized determinations of capacity.25  For this group of defendants, 
therefore, “[t]he capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt,” as Blackstone 
put it, was “not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of 
the delinquent’s understanding and judgment.”26 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, recognition of youth 
developmental differences took on a new character.  Progressive 
reformers,27 animated by worsening household conditions and scholarly 
reconceptualization of childhood,28 sought to establish separate courts to 
adjudicate young offenders29—sometimes as old as twenty-one.30  The new 
courts’ aim was to treat young offenders rather than punish them.31  As 
such, a concern for youth welfare took precedence over concerns with their 
offenses.32  The courts exercised states’ parens patriae authority33 to 
 
25 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23; see also Lerner, supra note 20, at 317. 
26 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *23. 
27 Reformers in this period are commonly called “child savers.”  See, e.g., MICHAEL B. 
KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 
118–20 (1986); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3 
(2d ed. 1977). 
28 See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 
693–94 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transformation]; see also Michael Grossberg, Changing 
Conceptions of Child Welfare in the United States, 1820–1935, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 3, 22–25 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) (attributing family problems, 
such as rising divorce and escalating juvenile delinquency, to economic structural changes 
and noting that new understandings of child development produced concerns about child 
vulnerability).  Works emphasizing the naturalness of children—such as that written by Jean 
Jacques Rousseau and Johann Pestalozzi, along with the works of G. Stanley Hall and 
Friedrich Froebel—influenced reformers.  See ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL 
CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA 
AMERICA 11, 80 (1998). 
29 In 1899, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the world’s first juvenile court law, the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 405 (West 2010)).  See BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 30 (1993).  Other states followed.  See id.  Within the decade after Illinois passed its 
law, ten states established children’s courts, and by 1925, all but two states had established 
specialized courts.  See id. 
30 Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to Be Punished: Some 
Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 191 (1989) (“The juvenile 
court movement assumed that young people under an articulated statutory age (sometimes as 
high as 21 years of age) are incapable of rational decisionmaking and thus lack the capacity 
for moral accountability assumed by the punitive model.”). 
31 See David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth 
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
supra note 28, at 42, 42; see also Karen Clanton, At the Helm: The Presiding Judges of the 
Juvenile Court, in A NOBLE SOCIAL EXPERIMENT? THE FIRST 100 YEARS OF THE COOK 
COUNTY JUVENILE COURT 1899–1999, at 74, 74 (Gwen Hoerr McNamee ed., 1999). 
32 See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119–20 (1909) (“The 
problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl committed a specific 
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emphasize treatment, supervision, and control in place of traditional, 
punitive criminal procedures.34  Because punishment and blameworthiness 
largely had no place in this rehabilitative model of justice, issues regarding 
youthfulness and culpability received little attention for much of the 
twentieth century.35 
That changed by the late 1980s with skyrocketing juvenile crime rates.  
Between 1980 and 1994, the number of juvenile arrests for violent offenses 
climbed 64% and juvenile arrests for murder specifically jumped 99%.36  
Media coverage of crime also exploded,37 and state legislatures responded 
in near universality.38  Over a period of just three years from 1992 to 1995, 
forty states enacted laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in adult 
 
wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his 
interest and in the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”). 
33 First asserted in the United States in a juvenile proceeding in Ex parte Crouse, 4 
Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839), the parens patriae authority justifies governmental intervention in 
the lives of individuals who are unable to care for themselves.  See Donna M. Bishop & 
Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities 
with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 127 n.7 (2007). 
34 See Mack, supra note 32, at 120 (arguing that “ordinary trappings” of criminal court 
are out of place in juvenile hearings, and the judge should sit “with the child at his side, 
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him”); see 
also Feld, Transformation, supra note 28, at 695. 
35 See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
547, 591 (2000). 
36 JEFFREY BUTTS & JEREMY TRAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN YOUTH 
VIOLENCE: 1980 TO 2000, at 2 (2002), available at http://goo.gl/N1uGQy.  From just 1984 to 
1993, the juvenile arrest rate for murder increased 167% from a rate of 5 arrests per 100,000 
juveniles to 14 per 100,000.  Id.; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1996 UPDATE ON 
VIOLENCE 14–15 (1996) (discussing the arrest rate trend beginning in the late 1980s and 
noting that “[i]f trends continue . . . juvenile arrests for violent crime will more than double 
by the year 2010”). 
37 See Network News in the Nineties: The Top Topics and Trends of the Decade, MEDIA 
MONITOR (Ctr. for Media & Pub. Affairs, Washington, D.C.), July/Aug. 1997, at 1–3.  
Between 1990 and 1997, one out of every ten stories on network evening news dealt with 
crime, climbing from 830 stories during 1992 to 2,574 during 1995.  See id. at 2.  At the 
same time, fear of crime increased dramatically, particularly in urban areas.  See Daniel 
Romer et al., Television News and the Cultivation of Fear of Crime, 53 J. COMM. 88, 95 
(2003). 
38 See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 11–13 (1998).  This universal 
urge to legislate, according to Professor Zimring, suggests a “disturbing” model of legal 
reform.  Absent a showing of deficiency in the current legal institutions’ abilities to deal with 
violence, “[l]egislative changes that are based solely on concern about high offense rates are 
vulnerable to error in a special way.”  Id. at 12. 
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criminal court,39 and forty-seven states and the District of Columbia made 
changes in their laws concerning juvenile crime.40  Although many 
observers mark the beginning of the end of the traditional juvenile court 
decades earlier when the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, spiking 
juvenile crime rates further upended support for rehabilitative ideals41 and 
amassed calls of “adult time” for “adult crime”42—especially as fear swirled 
regarding an entirely different breed of so-called super-predators.43  Taken 
together, the new legislative schemes represented a “fundamental shift” in 
juvenile justice away from rehabilitating offenders and toward punishing 
 
39 PATRICIA TORBERT ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 3 
(1996), available at http://goo.gl/2b5ZK2. 
40 See id. at 59.  Professor Feld situates this “get tough” era of juvenile justice in a 
broader context dating back to the 1960s when rehabilitation was replaced by a paradigm of 
just deserts, penal proportionality, and determinate sentences.  Barry C. Feld, A Century of 
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 
207–13 (2007). 
41 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8–9 
(2008); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A 
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 
137 (1998).  The Supreme Court in In re Gault extended to juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings some of the same constitutional rights to which defendants in criminal 
proceedings are entitled, including the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination.  See 387 U.S. 1, 41, 55 (1967).  Critics of the decision, including Justice 
Potter Stewart, argued it “serve[d] to convert a juvenile proceeding into a criminal 
prosecution” and thereby “invite[d] a long step backwards into the nineteenth century.”  Id. 
at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
42 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Keynote Address: Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth 
Crime, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 337, 351 n.54 (2006).  While the slogan appealed to retributive 
instincts, it also suggested that serious violence is not a characteristic of childhood but “is 
somehow adult.”  See ZIMRING, supra note 38, at 9. 
43 Some politicians, scholars, and media in the mid-1990s used the term “super-
predators” to describe an impending generation of violent young offenders.  See, e.g., 
Hearings on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act Before the Subcomm. on 
Early Childhood, Youth and Families of the H. Economic and Educational Opportunities 
Comm., 104th Cong. 90 (1996) (statement of Rep. William McCollum, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Crime, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the 
Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23; Bob Dole, Weekly Republican 
Radio Address (July 6, 1996), available at http://goo.gl/396Swt (“Unless something is done 
soon, some of today’s newborns will become tomorrow’s ‘super predators’—merciless 
criminals capable of committing the most vicious of acts for the most trivial reasons . . . .”).  
For others, the fact that the phenomenon never materialized, Gary Marx, Young Killers 
Remain Well-Publicized Rarity, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 11, 1998, § 1, at A1, was unsurprising, see 
Franklin E. Zimring, Crying Wolf Over Teen Demons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1996, at B5.  
But see Steve Drizin, Trayvon and the Myth of the ‘Juvenile Superpredator,’ HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 17, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://goo.gl/qnhzy6 (suggesting that even though “the 
superpredators never arrived,” still, “urban legends die hard”). 
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them.44  Over the coming several years, however, many began to question 
whether the “get-tough” laws and increasingly “adult” punishments were 
actually making the public safer.45 
B. FINDING YOUTHFULNESS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND NEUROSCIENCE 
As public debate surrounding youth prosecutions swelled, some 
researchers looked toward youth development with renewed interest.46  In 
the decades laying bare the promise of the rehabilitative juvenile justice 
model, both developmental psychologists and neuroscientists exploring the 
practice of brain imaging honed in on changes in brain composition and 
behavior occurring between adolescence and adulthood. 
Psychologists identified a number of important distinctive qualities 
attributable to youth.  For example, psychologists found early adolescence 
to be accompanied by increased susceptibility to peer pressure.47  
Adolescents were also found to attach more weight to short-term 
consequences,48 and they did not extend projections for consequences as far 
 
44 See TORBERT ET AL., supra note 39, at xi. 
45 See, e.g., Maya Bell, A Child, A Crime—An Adult Punishment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Oct. 21, 1999, at A-1 (“Research is thin, but every study on the subject, including the most 
thorough one conducted at the University of Florida, has shown that young offenders sent to 
adult prison commit more serious crimes quicker and more often after their releases than 
similar offenders who remain in the juvenile system.”); Barbara White Stack, Law Giving 
Juveniles Adult Time Under Fire, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 2001, at B-1 (“Two 
state senators . . . say it’s time to investigate whether the 5-year-old ‘adult time for adult 
crime’ law in Pennsylvania has lived up to its promise . . . .”); Tina Susman, Doubting the 
System, NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 2002, at A6. 
46 See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (And Should Not) Learn from Child 
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 33 (2009).  The MacArthur Foundation, for 
example, convened a group to study adolescent development and funded extensive research 
about effective juvenile crime policy.  See id. 
47 See Thomas J. Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 
15 DEV. PSYCHOL. 608, 608, 615 (1979) (studying youth in third, sixth, ninth, eleventh, and 
twelfth grades and finding conformity to peers to increase between third and ninth grade, and 
then decline); Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in 
Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 843, 848 (1986) (studying children in fifth, sixth, 
eighth, and ninth grades and noting that by ninth grade, the proportion of peer-oriented 
children leveled off); see also Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at 162. 
48 See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in 
ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 66 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); see also 
Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEV. 
REV. 339, 366–67 (1992) (concluding that high levels of reckless behavior during 
adolescence implicate developmental roots in sensation seeking and adolescent egocentrism, 
declining after adolescence—perhaps due to biology, increased maturity, and young people 
assuming greater responsibilities); Scott & Grisso, supra note 41, at 164. 
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into the future as did older youth.49  Psychologists additionally discovered 
evidence suggesting that adolescents may be driven more by rewards and 
less by risks than “adults” are.50  Moreover, psychologists found empirical 
support for the theory on adolescence first articulated by Erik Erikson,51 
which suggested that moving into adulthood involved changes in the way 
young people formed their identities.52 
In the field of neuroscience, research began to depict adolescence as a 
period of continued brain growth and change.  A pair of neuroimaging 
studies in 1999, for instance, showed continued development through 
adolescence of the brain’s frontal lobe53—essential for such functions as 
anticipating consequences, planning, and controlling impulses.54  Gray 
matter in the frontal lobe was shown to spike just prior to adolescence55 and 
 
49 See A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things 
Future Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99, 102, 108–09 (1986) (studying ninth 
graders, twelfth graders, and college sophomores). 
50 See Leon Mann et al., Adolescent Decision-Making: The Development of Competence, 
12 J. ADOLESCENCE 265, 275 (1989) (“[O]ur analysis of the modest evidence leads us to 
conclude that by age 15 years many adolescents have achieved a reasonable level of 
competence . . . .  However, like all humans, adolescents do not consistently behave as 
competent decision makers . . . .”).  But see Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in 
Adolescence: A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 1, 38 (1992) (“Our review of 
the empirical evidence on risk taking and of the literature on cognitive development and 
decision-making skills has found mixed results regarding the degree to which adolescents 
may be taking more risks than other age levels.”). 
51 See Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development from Adolescence to Adulthood: An 
Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 DEV. PSYCHOL. 341, 346, 355 (1982) (“It 
is during the college years that the greatest gains in identity formation appear to occur.”). 
52 For an articulation of Professor Erikson’s theory, see generally ERIK H. ERIKSON, 
IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE (W.W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1959); ERIK H. ERIKSON, 
IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).  Professor Erikson artfully described adolescence as “a 
vital regenerator in the process of social evolution.”  ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS, 
supra, at 134. 
53 Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A 
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et 
al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 
2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 860 (1999).  These studies used 3D image mapping 
techniques, whereas early quantitative structural brain-imaging studies in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s could not assess density.  See Arthur W. Toga et al., Mapping Brain Maturation, 
29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCES 148, 149 (2006). 
54 See Adam Ortiz, Adolescence, Brain Development and Legal Culpability, A.B.A. JUV. 
JUST. CTR., Jan. 2004, at 1, available at http://goo.gl/b98tT2; see also Inside the Teenage 
Brain: Interview: Jay Giedd, PBS FRONTLINE (2002), http://goo.gl/IeSz3u (“The frontal lobe 
is often called the CEO, or the executive of the brain. . . .  It’s a part of the brain that most 
separates man from beast, if you will.”). 
55 See Giedd et al., supra note 53, at 861 (finding gray matter to increase to maximum 
sizes around the ages of twelve and eleven for males and females respectively). 
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then decrease between adolescence and early adulthood56 in a process 
known as pruning.  Like sculpting a tree, pruning mirrors “cutting back 
branches [to] stimulate[] health and growth.”57  The gray matter reduction is 
accompanied by a white matter increase.58  Through the cellular maturation 
process known as myelination, white matter development is said to improve 
cognitive functioning.59  Because the samples for these studies were limited 
in age, however, they could not support conclusions about the endpoint of 
brain maturation.60  When a team of neuroscientists finally mapped the 
trajectory of brain maturation using a sample of individuals ranging in age 
from seven to eighty-seven, they observed gray matter density changes 
continuing beyond adolescence into adulthood.61 
Psychology professors Laurence Steinberg and Elizabeth Scott 
adopted the thrust of these and other emerging neuroscientific studies 
showing brain maturation to continue into early adulthood as part of their 
influential 2003 article, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence.62  Combined 
with psychological research, discoveries regarding the brain systems 
implicated in judgment and impulse control provided the basis for 
Professors Steinberg and Scott’s argument that youth should not be held to 
the adult standard of criminal responsibility.63  The authors, renowned in 
 
56 See id. at 861–62; Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860. 
57 Ortiz, supra note 54, at 2. 
58 See id. 
59 See Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860.  For additional general descriptions of brain 
development, see, for example, Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of 
Youth: Implications for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 428, 
433 (2011); Claudia Wallis, What Makes Teens Tick, TIME, May 10, 2004, at 56. 
60 See Toga et al., supra note 54, at 150–51; see also Giedd et al., supra note 53, at 861 
(finding gray matter to decrease following adolescence through age twenty-two, the oldest 
age of those studied); Sowell et al., supra note 53, at 860 (finding loss of gray matter to 
continue up to age thirty, the oldest age of those studied). 
61 See Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Cortical Change Across the Human Life Span, 
6 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 309, 309–10 (2003).  Other researchers have reached similar 
conclusions.  See Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of 
Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 
10937, 10938, 10943 (“[W]e show within-subject brain development during young 
adulthood in association tracts, particularly frontal connections needed for complex 
cognitive tasks such as inhibition, executive functioning, and attention.”) (studying subjects 
aged 5.6 to 29.3 years old); see also Melinda Beck, Delayed Development: 20-Somethings 
Blame the Brain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2012, at D1; Tony Cox, Brain Maturity Extends Well 
Beyond Teen Years (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 10, 2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/LWW77k. 
62 See generally Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death 
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003). 
63 See id. at 1011–13. 
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their fields, asserted that youth culpability should be mitigated for those 
under eighteen due to adolescents’ diminished decisionmaking capacities, 
their relatively lower ability to resist coercive influences, and the fact that 
their characters still undergo change.64  Although the professors 
acknowledged that “we are a long way from comprehensive scientific 
understanding in this area, and research findings are unlikely to ever be 
sufficiently precise to draw a chronological age boundary between those 
who have adult decision-making capacity and those who do not,”65 they 
concluded that sufficient evidence mandated a change in juvenile 
punishment.66 
C. ATTAINING EIGHTH AMENDMENT SIGNIFICANCE 
1. Roper v. Simmons 
In 2005, psychological and neuroscientific evidence-based 
explanations for youthfulness found their way into Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  The Court for the first time endorsed scientific findings 
relating to human development in support of reducing youth culpability in 
Roper v. Simmons, the case of a teenager sentenced to capital punishment 
for murder.67  Christopher Simmons sought postconviction relief after the 
Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia,68 holding executing a mentally 
retarded person to be unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment.  
Despite the grisly details of his crime,69 Simmons argued that the same 
reasoning in Atkins prohibited the execution of a juvenile who committed 
his crime when he was younger than eighteen.70  The Supreme Court 
 
64 See id. at 1009. 
65 Id. at 1016. 
66 Id. at 1017. 
67 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  The importance of the Court injecting science into its reasoning 
was not lost on commentators.  See Bishop & Farber, supra note 33, at 125 (“Although 
Roper will always be best known as the case that abolished the juvenile death penalty in 
America, the decision is at least equally noteworthy for its endorsement and application of 
scientific findings relating to adolescent developmental immaturity.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience Is Transforming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
48, 51 (Mar. 11, 2007) (“[Justice Kennedy’s] indirect reference to the scientific studies in the 
briefs led some supporters and critics to view the decision as the Brown v. Board of 
Education of neurolaw.”). 
68 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
69 Simmons—and a friend, who was fifteen at the time—broke into a woman’s home, 
bound her eyes and mouth, then drove to a state park, reinforced her bindings, and threw her 
from a bridge, drowning her.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 556–57.  Disturbingly, Simmons 
assured his friends they could “get away with it” because they were minors.  See id. at 556. 
70 Id. at 559. 
680 KELSEY B. SHUST [Vol. 104 
reconsidered precedent and agreed.71  In an opinion written by Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, the Court held that the objective indicia of consensus 
then provided sufficient evidence that society views juveniles as 
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”72  Juveniles up to 
the age of eighteen, according to the Court, comprise a certain class of 
offenders for which the death penalty may not be imposed.73  Because 
Roper extended to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds the same protection that 
Thompson v. Oklahoma provided for those under sixteen, the greatest 
significance of the Court’s opinion might have come not from what the 
Court said, but how it said it. 
Specifically, in describing the class of offenders to whom capital 
punishment can no longer be imposed, the Court relied on three differences 
between “juveniles under 18” and “adults”—lacking maturity, being 
vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, and not having as 
well-formed characters.74  These findings, according to the Court, reflected 
both what “any parent knows” and what scientific and sociological studies 
tend to confirm.75  As a result of these characteristics, young offenders were 
held to be less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes, less 
likely to be deterred by the prospect of death sentences, and less likely to be 
irretrievably depraved.76 
While the Roper Court differentiated “juveniles under 18” from 
“adults,” it acknowledged the limitation of such a categorization.  Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
 
71 See id. at 559–60.  In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court rejected an opportunity to rule 
out capital punishment for defendants over fifteen but under the age of eighteen.  492 U.S. 
361, 377–78 (1989).  Justice Antonin Scalia, questioning petitioner’s evidence-based 
argument, wrote: “petitioners and their supporting amici marshal an array of socioscientific 
evidence concerning the psychological and emotional development of 16- and 17-year-olds.  
If such evidence could conclusively establish the entire lack of deterrent effect and moral 
responsibility, resort to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be 
unnecessary . . . .”  Id.  While Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the 5–4 Court, 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor did not join this part.  See id. at 380–82. 
72 Roper, 543 U.S. at 567–68 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (relying on evidence that a majority of states rejected the juvenile death penalty, it 
was used infrequently, and a trend toward abolishment existed). 
73 See id. at 568.  Roper extended the protection to sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds that 
Thompson v. Oklahoma provided for those under sixteen.  See 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
74 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
75 Id. at 569.  The Court cited Arnett, supra note 48, at 339, for the first finding; 
Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1014, for the second finding; and ERIKSON, IDENTITY: 
YOUTH AND CRISIS, supra note 52, for the third finding. 
76 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570–71.  These arguments regarding retribution and 
blameworthiness mirror those the Court rejected in Stanford v. Kentucky.  See 492 U.S. 361, 
377–78 (1989). 
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disappear when an individual turns 18.”77  Still, the Court insisted upon 
drawing a bright line for ruling out the death penalty as disproportionate 
punishment, looking beyond criminal punishment to suggest a national 
consensus fitting within the Eighth Amendment rubric.  Since eighteen is 
“where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood,” the Court concluded, so too it is where “the line for death 
eligibility ought to rest.”78  The Court thus rejected an individualized 
standard of culpability based on youthfulness in favor of a categorical rule 
to protect all offenders below the age of eighteen. 
2. Graham v. Florida 
The Court cemented its bright line for mitigating unduly harsh 
punishment in Graham.  There the Court considered a challenge to a 
mandatory life sentence for a seventeen-year-old who committed a pair of 
nonhomicide felonies.79  In another opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the 
Court found that Terrance Jamar Graham’s life-without-parole punishment 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment based on three related concerns: 
(1) the offender’s limited culpability, (2) the particular severity of life 
imprisonment without parole, and (3) the failure of penological theories of 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation to justify such 
punishment.80 
For the first consideration, the Graham Court relied on Roper’s 
holding that juveniles are less culpable and therefore less deserving of the 
most severe punishments because they lack maturity, are more vulnerable to 
negative influences and outside pressures, and their characters are not as 
well-formed.81  The Court also noted that no “recent data” provided a 
 
77 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
78 Id.  The majority noted that its rule might be overinclusive.  Some members of the 
protected class likely had “attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach.”  Id.  
Underinclusivity, however, was not a concern. 
79 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010).  Police learned that Terrance 
Jamar Graham robbed several homes while he was on probation for armed burglary and 
attempted armed robbery.  See id. at 2018–20.  The trial court revoked Graham’s probation 
and sentenced him to life in prison.  See id. at 2020. 
80 See id. at 2026–30. 
81 Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).  The Graham Court continued:  
These salient characteristics mean that it is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the 
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.  Accordingly, juvenile 
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders.  A juvenile is not 
absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression is not as morally reprehensible as 
that of an adult. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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reason for the Court to reconsider Roper’s sociological and scientific 
observations.82  Instead, further developments in psychology and brain 
science continued to show “fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds,”83 including that “parts of the brain involved in behavior 
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”84 
For the second consideration regarding the severity of life without 
parole, the Court acknowledged the reality of passing time.  Life-without-
parole sentences already constitute “the second most severe penalty 
permitted by law.”85  Furthermore, under sentences of life without parole, 
younger offenders generally serve more years and greater percentages of 
their lives behind bars than adults.86  Consequently, the Court noted that 
imposing such punishments on younger offenders was especially harsh.87 
Finally, the Graham Court considered penological justifications for 
juvenile sentences of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.  
Weaving many of Roper’s developmental findings into its analysis, the 
Court found that none of the goals of punishment provided adequate 
justification for sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without 
parole.88  The Court ruled out retribution (because of offenders’ reduced 
moral culpability),89 deterrence (because of their impetuousness),90 
incapacitation (because of offenders’ capacity for change),91 and 
rehabilitation (because life without parole forswears any potential 
rehabilitation).92  Finding no legitimate justification for Graham’s sentence, 
the Court found that it was by its nature disproportionate and failed to pass 
Eighth Amendment muster.93 
3. Miller v. Alabama 
The Court extended its reliance on youth developmental differences 
even further in Miller, which concerned two cases of fourteen-year-olds 
 
82 See id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (citation omitted). 
85 Id. at 2027 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
86 Id. at 2028 (“A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole 
receive the same punishment in name only.  This reality cannot be ignored.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
87 See id. 
88 See id. at 2028–31. 
89 Id. at 2028. 
90 Id. at 2028–29. 
91 Id. at 2029. 
92 Id. at 2029–30. 
93 See id. at 2030. 
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mandatorily sentenced to life in prison without parole for their involvement 
in murders.94  The Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
mandatory sentencing schemes that do not allow judges or juries to consider 
the mitigating characteristics of youth, as precedent established that 
“children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing.”95 
Here again, the Court relied upon the distinct developmental qualities 
of youth that render young offenders less culpable and impair penological 
justifications for their punishment.96  But this time, the Court did not rely on 
national consensus against the punishment or find reason to limit its holding 
to specific types of crimes.97  Rather, the Court melded Roper and 
Graham’s focus on prohibiting severe punishments based on certain 
offenders’ reduced culpability with other precedent that requires sentencing 
authorities to consider defendants’ characteristics in doling out the most 
severe punishments.98  In so doing, the Court noted that the “distinctive 
(and transitory) mental traits and environmental vulnerabilities” of youth 
were hardly crime-specific.99  In addition, it noted that life-without-parole 
sentences should be treated as akin to capital punishment when the 
offenders are young.100  Because youth matters in determining whether an 
irrevocable sentence is appropriate, the Court held that “a judge or jury 
must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before 
imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”101 
 
94 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).  Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen when 
he robbed a video store with two friends, one of whom shot the clerk when she threatened to 
call police.  Id. at 2461.  Evan Miller was fourteen when he and a friend smoked marijuana 
and drank with a neighbor.  Id. at 2462.  When the neighbor passed out, Miller tried to steal 
his wallet, but the neighbor awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat.  See id.  Miller and his 
friend beat him with a baseball bat then set his trailer on fire, killing him.  See id.  An 
Arkansas statute mandated life in prison without parole for Jackson, who was convicted of 
capital murder, and Alabama law prescribed the punishment for Miller’s conviction for 
murder in the course of arson.  See id. at 2461, 2462–63. 
95 Id. at 2464.  The Court’s holding turned on finding that mandatory sentencing schemes 
pose “too great a risk of disproportionate punishment” because they make “youth (and all 
that accompanies it) irrelevant” to the imposition of the harshest prison sentence and can 
weaken rationales for punishment.  Id. at 2469. 
96 See id. at 2464–65. 
97 See id. at 2465, 2470–71.  Although the majority opinion provides some argument 
regarding “objective indicia,” id. at 2471–73, the crux of its holding relied on individualized 
sentencing precedent, id. at 2471, 2472 n.11. 
98 See id. at 2463. 
99 Id. at 2465. 
100 Id. at 2466. 
101 Id. at 2475. 
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Despite its lofty phrasing about the importance of youth in sentencing, 
Miller firmly cabined its holding to those under the age of eighteen.102  
Lower courts following Miller unsurprisingly do the same.  Rather than 
embracing Miller’s appeal for individualized sentencing before the harshest 
possible penalties can be imposed, they cling to the hardline dichotomy 
between “juvenile” and “adult” offenders.  For example, a Florida court of 
appeals tersely rejected the petition of a defendant who was nineteen when 
he committed his crime.103  To the extent that the petitioner asked the 
Florida court to expand Graham and Miller “to other ‘youthful offenders’ 
under the age of 21,” the court noted it was “bound by the pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court of the United States.”104  Several other courts 
following the earlier decisions in Roper and Graham similarly invoked the 
Supreme Court’s bright line to reject young adults’ Eighth Amendment 
claims.105  The following Part illustrates why the reasoning underpinning 
Roper, Graham, and Miller requires courts to allow defendants up to age 
twenty-five to present evidence in mitigation about their youth at the time 
of their crimes. 
II. DISCUSSION 
While the Court for decades has considered youth to be less culpable 
and recently invoked science to support a new era in that tradition, it refuses 
to recognize that young people just over the chronological age of eighteen 
might similarly be less culpable.  Yet, the Court recognizes that that age is 
an imperfect proxy for diminished culpability.  The Roper majority stated 
 
102 Id. at 2460. 
103 Janvier v. State, No. 4D13-1695, slip op. at 1–2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013); see 
also Wilcox v. Rozum, No. 13-3761, 2013 WL 6731906, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013); 
People v. Riley, No. 4-12-0225, 2013 WL 936435, at *11 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 8, 2013); 
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).  In Cintora, the State 
described the inapplicability of Miller by giving the defendant’s age down to the day.  See 
Brief for Appellee, Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (No. 3272 EDA 2012), 2013 WL 3858919, at *10 
(“[T]he principles set forth in Miller only apply to defendants less than 18 years of age. . . .  
[D]efendant was 19 years, 13 days [] old; when he committed the crimes for which he was 
convicted.”). 
104 Janvier, slip op. at 1–2. 
105 See, e.g., Tercero v. Stephens, No. 13-70010, slip op. at 12 (5th Cir. Dec. 18, 2013) 
(eighteen-year-old); In re Garner, 612 F. 3d 533, 534 (6th Cir. 2010) (nineteen-year-old); 
Hosch v. Alabama, No. CR-10-0188, 2013 WL 5966906, at *64 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 
2013) (twenty-year-old); Thompson v. State, No. CR-05-0073, 2012 WL 520873, at *77–79 
(Ala. Crim. App. Feb. 17, 2012) (eighteen-year-old); Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, 584 (Fla. 
2006) (twenty-three-year-old); Jean-Michel v. State, 96 So. 3d 1043, 1044–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2012) (nineteen-year-old); State v. Campbell, 983 So. 2d 810, 830 (La. 2008) 
(eighteen-year-old); State v. Garcell, 678 S.E.2d 618, 645, 647 n.10 (N.C. 2009) (eighteen-
year-old). 
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that “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear 
when an individual turns 18.”106 
This Part presents three reasons why clinging to the bright line at 
eighteen for mitigating punishment is inadequate.  Holding the mitigating 
factors of youth to be relevant only until age eighteen is inconsistent with, 
and overextends, the very scientific and sociological data the Supreme 
Court touts.  Further, relying on the age of eighteen simply because 
eighteen “is the point where society draws the line for many purposes 
between childhood and adulthood”107 inappropriately equates the right not 
to be punished more severely than one deserves with affirmative rights to 
engage in certain adult conduct.  Finally, drawing a bright line at eighteen 
and disregarding the characteristics of older youthful defendants fails to 
serve any of the penological justifications that the Supreme Court has ruled 
imperative for harsh and irrevocable sentences. 
A. OVEREXTENDING THE DATA 
The Court has eagerly espoused scientific and sociological data to 
bolster its conclusions regarding what makes “juveniles” developmentally 
and constitutionally different from “adults.”  But the Court has been less 
than eager to address the research’s inability to identify a precise point 
when developmental maturity can be convincingly presumed for the entire 
class of youth—even in the very data it cites.  As one team of researchers 
has lamented: “Unfortunately, judges, politicians, advocates, and journalists 
are biased toward drawing a single line between adolescence and adulthood 
for different purposes under the law that is at odds with developmental 
cognitive neuroscience.”108 
Examples from Miller and Roper demonstrate this point.  Miller and 
Roper both point to Professors Steinberg and Scott’s Less Guilty by Reason 
of Adolescence as authority for the developmental differences between 
 
106 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).  In her Roper dissent, Justice 
O’Connor took issue with the rule’s overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.  See id. at 
601–02 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he age-based line . . . quite likely will protect a 
number of offenders who are mature enough to deserve the death penalty and may well leave 
vulnerable many who are not.”); see also Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-
Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 259 (1989) (“If age 
corresponded perfectly to the combination of relevant factors, then its use as a ‘bright line’ 
would not be problematic.  Because age is not a ‘perfect’ proxy, however, its use as a ‘bright 
line’ necessarily produces ordinal disproportionality, or comparative injustice.”). 
107 Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
108 B.J. Casey et al., The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 111, 122 
(2008) (citation omitted).  It was their hope to present research “to make strides in moving 
this single line to multiple lines that consider developmental changes across both context 
(emotionally charged or not) and time (in the moment or in the future).”  Id. 
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those under and those over eighteen.109  Yet, Professors Steinberg and Scott 
explicitly note that research findings are “unlikely to ever be sufficiently 
precise to draw a chronological age boundary” for acquiring adult 
decisionmaking capacities.110  Further, some of the studies on which they 
rely actually show development continuing beyond age eighteen.111  Miller 
also relies on two briefs to suggest that the science supporting Roper’s and 
Graham’s conclusions has “become even stronger.”112  While it is true that 
those briefs point to additional research, that research hardly supports the 
Court’s bright line.  Quite the opposite: the brief from a group of 
psychology professors notes how a youth’s brain “is not fully mature until 
an individual reaches his or her twenties.”113  Compellingly, it points to 
research from National Institute of Mental Health neuroscientist Jay Giedd, 
who concluded that the parts of the brain linked to decisionmaking and 
impulse inhibition do not fully develop until that time.114  The American 
Psychological Association amici brief similarly notes how juveniles’ 
development continues throughout late adolescence and into young 
adulthood.115  In describing such findings, the American Psychological 
 
109 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra 
note 62); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 570, 573 (same).  In total, the majority in Roper cites 
Professors Steinberg and Scott four times. 
110 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1016.  Even though they acknowledged the 
scientific imprecision for drawing a boundary, the psychologists advanced policy arguments 
in support of one.  For instance, they rejected a case-by-case approach for mitigation as an 
unacceptable, “error-prone undertaking” when the stakes are life and death.  See id.  They 
also advocated a boundary, even when it excluded potentially deserved youth, to avoid 
practical inefficiencies and cases in which immaturity might be ignored due to particular 
desires to impose punitive punishments.  See id.  For discussion of how a youthfulness 
presumption could address these concerns, see infra Parts III.A.1 & III.B.2. 
111 See, e.g., Steinberg & Scott, supra note 62, at 1012 (citing Elizabeth Cauffman & 
Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be 
Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741 (2000)).  Cauffman and Steinberg 
examined the relationship between age, psychosocial maturity, and antisocial 
decisionmaking, finding that “the period between 16 and 19 marks an important transition 
point in psychosocial development that is potentially relevant to debates about the drawing 
of legal boundaries between adolescence and adulthood.”  Cauffman & Steinberg, supra, at 
756.  For a thorough critique of the Supreme Court’s scientific pitfalls in Roper, see 
generally Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006). 
112 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 n.5. 
113 Brief of Amici Curiae J. Lawrence Aber et al. in Support of Petitioners at 15–16, 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (citations omitted). 
114 Id. at 16 n.19 (citing Jay N. Giedd, Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the 
Adolescent Brain, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 77, 83 (2004); see also supra note 61. 
115 See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 5, 9, Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647). 
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Association skirts the binary “juvenile” and “adult” labels it originally set 
out to apply.116 
Recent psychological and sociological research further calls the 
Court’s strict classifications of “juveniles” and “adults” into question.  
Similar to how psychologist G. Stanley Hall identified a new life stage of 
“adolescence” at the turn of the twentieth century,117 researchers today are 
redefining young adulthood.118  Alluding to milestones that traditionally 
defined the transition to adulthood,119 sociologists are charting the course of 
a “changing timetable” for development.120  Leading that charge is Jeffrey 
Arnett, the same psychologist and research professor cited in Roper who 
has since marshaled support for a new stage of life lasting from the late 
 
116 See id. at 6 n.3.  The error is understandable: “Adulthood,” “adolescence,” and “early 
adulthood” have no clear definitional parameters, and researchers often prescribe different 
labels.  See Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During 
Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8174, 8174 (describing 
“adolescence and early adulthood” as encompassing ages seventeen to nineteen but also 
describing as “children and adolescents” a sample of people ages four to twenty-one).  
Compare Casey et al., supra note 108, at 117 fig.4 (showing measures in a bar graph for 
“adolescents” (ages thirteen to seventeen) and “adults” (ages twenty-three to twenty-nine)), 
with id. at 118 fig.5 (showing a measure in a scatterplot for “adults” (ages eighteen to 
thirty)). 
117 In 1904, G. Stanley Hall published his two-volume magnum opus on what was then 
considered a new life stage, adolescence.  G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS 
PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, 
RELIGION AND EDUCATION (1904). 
118 This period of young adulthood—subjected to many labels, such as “adultescence,” 
“extended adolescence,” and “youthhood”—has become the subject of much interest.  See 
Kay S. Hymowitz, Where Have the Good Men Gone?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2011, at C1; 
Hope Reese, Yes, 20-Somethings Are Taking Longer to Grow Up—but Why?, ATLANTIC 
(Nov. 30, 2012, 12:52 PM), http://goo.gl/FS0muB; see also Lev Grossman, Grow Up? Not 
So Fast, TIME, Jan. 16, 2005, at 43; Press Release, MacArthur Foundation, Interdisciplinary 
Research on the Transition to Adulthood (Aug. 5, 2004), available at http://goo.gl/7U7Vbz 
(announcing a $5.2 million grant in support of research “examining the new challenges 
facing young people, ages 18 to 34”). 
119 See JEFFREY JENSEN ARNETT, EMERGING ADULTHOOD: THE WINDING ROAD FROM THE 
LATE TEENS THROUGH THE TWENTIES, at v (2004) (noting how sociologists define the 
transition to adulthood in terms of young people finishing school, entering full-time work, 
getting married, and becoming parents); see also JENNIFER M. SILVA, COMING UP SHORT: 
WORKING-CLASS ADULTHOOD IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 6 (2013).  For a suggestion of 
“new” adult milestones, see Sue Shellenbarger, New Ways to Gauge What Grown-Up 
Means, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2013, at D3. 
120 See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., On the Frontier of Adulthood: Emerging Themes 
and New Directions, in ON THE FRONTIER OF ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 3, 5 (Richard A. Settersten, Jr. et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter ON THE FRONTIER]; see 
also Robin Marantz Henig, What Is It About 20-Somethings?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 22, 
2010, at 28. 
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teens through the mid- to late twenties—“emerging adulthood.”121  Among 
the trends on which Professor Arnett and others rely, young people are 
putting off marriage.122  In fact, the timing of marriage has unprecedentedly 
shifted into older ages in recent years.123  Young people are also living with 
their parents longer and with greater frequency.124  When they do not live 
with their parents, they are still unlikely to have families of their own.125  
As a result, by choice or circumstance,126 young people are forestalling the 
beginning of traditionally “adult” life.  To impose Roper, Graham, and 
Miller language, they appear to lack the degree of maturity that previous 
generations of adults commanded, they still seem vulnerable to outside 
pressures, and their characters remain not very “well-formed.”127 
Some of the stimuli behind the delay in adulthood are unsurprising: 
Americans’ views toward young people’s sexual relationships have 
 
121 See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Susan Taber, Adolescence Terminable and Interminable: 
When Does Adolescence End?, 23 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 517, 534 (1994) (coining the 
phrase).  See generally ARNETT, supra note 119; EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF 
AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006); 
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late Teens 
Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOL. 469 (2000).  Professor Arnett’s term “emerging 
adulthood” seems to have taken off, while previous characterizations, such as “the postponed 
generation” or “incompletely-launched young adults,” have not.  In fact, a multidisciplinary, 
international research organization dedicated to the study of “emerging adulthood” has 
formed.  See About SSEA, SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF EMERGING ADULTHOOD, 
http://goo.gl/BU2FPB (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
122 See ARNETT, supra note 119, at 4–5; SILVA, supra note 119, at 6. 
123 See Erin Migdol, Delaying Marriage Has Serious Consequences for Some, New 
Research Reveals, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://goo.gl/Pxgscd 
(describing how the average ages for marriage have never been higher than they are now for 
women (26.5) and men (28.7)); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST 
MARRIAGE BY SEX: 1890 TO 2013, at fig.MS-2 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/RwBjwl. 
124 See RICHARD FRY, PEW RES. CTR., A RISING SHARE OF YOUNG ADULTS LIVE IN THEIR 
PARENTS’ HOME 11 (2013), available at http://goo.gl/BJUVGS; see also Robert F. Schoeni 
& Karen E. Ross, Material Assistance from Families During the Transition to Adulthood, in 
ON THE FRONTIER, supra note 120, at 396, 413 (“In 1990, 70% of eighteen-year-olds lived 
with their parents, falling to 30% by age twenty-four and to 10% by age thirty.  Between 
1970 and 1990 there was a monotonic rise in shared housing.  Between the ages of twenty 
and twenty-six, there was a roughly 10 percentage point rise in the share of children living at 
home.”). 
125 See Elizabeth Fussell & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The Transition to Adulthood 
During the Twentieth Century: Race, Nativity, and Gender, in ON THE FRONTIER, supra note 
120, at 29, 31, 33 fig.2.3, 58. 
126 For critiques of the millennial generation as self-absorbed and needlessly coddled, 
see, for example, Jeffrey Zaslow, The Coddling Crisis: Why Americans Think Adulthood 
Begins at Age 26, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at D1; 60 Minutes: The Millennials Are Coming 
(CBS television broadcast May 25, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/HFIhlo. 
127 See ARNETT, supra note 119, at 6, 8–9. 
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changed.128  More people are pursuing higher education.129  And a sluggish 
job market and burdensome student loan debt have otherwise stalled buying 
homes and starting families.130  The legal implications of such a delay, 
however, are less than clear.  For this reason, the Court’s continued reliance 
on a categorical line at age eighteen to divide the supposedly scientifically 
and sociologically mature from the immature for mitigating punishment is 
troubling.  The research on which the Court relies does not support such a 
line, and additional research suggests that the relevant youthful qualities 
continue to materialize in individuals into their twenties. 
Even though the Court invoked science and sociological data to 
support its Roper, Graham, and Miller holdings, it makes sense, then, that 
the Court turned to more a conventional analysis in its rare attempt to 
justify the line.131  In this way, the Court suggests that its developmental 
analysis for punishment applies only within the bounds of previously 
existing legal conceptions of childhood and adulthood.132  The following 
Part demonstrates the asymmetry in such an approach. 
  
 
128 See id. at 5. 
129 See id. at 5–6; see also Furstenberg, Jr. et al., supra note 120, at 3, 6. 
130 See Shellenbarger, supra note 119; see also Derek Thompson, Adulthood, Delayed: 
What Has the Recession Done to Millennials?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
http://goo.gl/0OJgSB. 
131 Recall the Court reasoned that although “[t]he qualities that distinguish juveniles 
from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18 . . . [t]he age of 18 is the point 
where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”  Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); see also Ronald Roesch et al., Social Science and the 
Courts: The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 4 (1991) (“Because 
judges are trained in the law and are generally unfamiliar with psychology’s research 
methodology and statistics, they are naturally more inclined to rely on legal scholarship and 
precedent when they make their decisions.  The differences in training and approaches to 
scholarship make communication between the two disciplines difficult.”). 
132 See Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile 
Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 144–45 (2009) (“[T]he impact of adolescent brain 
science on juvenile justice has been strongly cabined by the extrinsic reality of legal 
doctrine. . . .  [D]octrinal forces are so entrenched and of such broad applicability within 
criminal law, adolescent brain science is inadequate to provoke deep change, at least within 
the courts.”).  The dissents in Roper argue that the other Justices’ independent moral 
judgment about youth culpability—and not science—is the fulcrum on which the judgment 
turns.  Justice O’Connor recognized that the rule decreed by the Court “rests, ultimately, on 
its independent moral judgment that death is a disproportionately severe punishment for any 
17-year-old offender.”  Roper, 543 U.S. at 588 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Additionally, 
Justice Scalia wrote that “[o]f course, the real force driving today’s decision is . . . the 
Court’s own judgment that murderers younger than 18 can never be as morally culpable as 
older counterparts.”  Id. at 615 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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B. CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT NOT COMPARABLE TO AFFIRMATIVE 
RIGHTS TO ENGAGE IN “ADULT” CONDUCT 
A categorical rule mitigating punishment based on youthfulness only 
for those under eighteen is additionally inadequate because it fails to 
recognize the exceptionality of criminal punishment compared to other 
contexts of the law where bright-line classifications pervade.  States 
undoubtedly draw bright-line rules to regulate the age at which young 
people can vote,133 serve on juries,134 marry,135 drive,136 gamble,137 and 
drink.138  Young people similarly have age-based rights to enter into 
contracts139 and choose how doctors may treat them.140  These categorical 
rules granting individuals affirmative rights over their conduct amount to 
“crude determination[s]” that young people of certain ages are mature 
enough to act in society, in some respects, as adults.141  Young people can 
test out certain adult privileges, in spite of the special risks of the learning 
periods involved.142 
The Court since Roper, however, has conflated this area of granting 
affirmative rights to young people to try out adult activity with criminal 
punishment.  Unlike other laws that regulate behavior, criminal punishment 
involves finding people morally blameworthy.  Andrew von Hirsch has 
explained that punishment is different from other government-generated 
 
133 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment guarantees eighteen-year-olds the right to vote, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXVI, and almost every state recognizes a voting age of eighteen, see 
Roper, 543 U.S. at 581 app. B. 
134 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 583 app. C. 
135 See id. at 585 app. D. 
136 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 842 app. C (1988) (“Most States have 
various provisions regulating driving age, from learner’s permits through driver’s licenses.  
In all States but one, 15-year-olds either may not drive, or may drive only with parental 
consent or accompaniment.”). 
137 See id. at 847 app. F. 
138 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22(d); ALA. CODE § 28-1-5 (LexisNexis 2013); 235 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-16 (West 2013); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65(1) 
(McKinney 2011); 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4-493(1) (West Supp. 2013); TEX. ALCO. 
BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.03 (West Supp. 2013). 
139 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-14-5(b) (LexisNexis 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6700 (West 
2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/242 (West 2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 431.056 (West 
2000); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-101(1) (McKinney 2012). 
140 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6922 (West 
2013); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/1 (West 2011); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 
(McKinney 2012); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10101.1 (West 2012); see also Elizabeth S. 
Scott, The Legal Construction of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 
28, at 113, 120. 
141 See Scott, supra note 141, at 120. 
142 See ZIMRING, supra note 38, at 72 (noting such activities as driving). 
2014] EXTENDING SENTENCING MITIGATION 691 
benefits because its defining characteristic includes state censure.143  When 
the state finds people blameworthy, “the requirement of equal treatment 
becomes much stronger” because unequal treatment implies that they are 
unequally blameworthy.144  Drawing a bright line between those who are 
under and over eighteen for mitigating punishment thus implies they are 
unequally blameworthy, even though they might possess the same 
developmental traits that render them less culpable.  The Roper, Graham, 
and Miller decisions applied to those over eighteen therefore overlook the 
important and unique goals for imposing criminal punishment of treating 
equally culpable offenders equally and making individualized inquiries of 
culpability for society’s harshest punishments.145 
In the capital punishment context, the need for an individualized 
inquiry to measure a person’s blameworthiness is hardly a new concept.  
Lockett v. Ohio recognized that individualized decisions are essential in 
capital cases, fearing that the death penalty might be imposed “in spite of 
factors which may call for a less severe penalty.”146  Eddings v. Oklahoma 
then highlighted the obligation of sentencing judges and juries to consider 
youthful defendants’ mental and emotional development as part of their 
calculi.147  As the Eddings Court stated, “youth is more than a chronological 
fact.  It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most 
susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”148  After Roper, 
however, these decisions have had little meaning for offenders just over 
eighteen.  Those whose mental and emotional development is slowed likely 
face greater burdens in proving youthfulness as a mitigating circumstance.  
 
143 See Andrew von Hirsch, Selective Incapacitation Reexamined: The National 
Academy of Sciences’ Report on Criminal Careers and “Career Criminals,” 7 CRIM. JUST. 
ETHICS 19, 27 (1988). 
144 See id. 
145 Some children’s rights advocates fear that criminal legal developments that do not 
recognize the differences between criminal law and other decisionmaking contexts might 
undermine youth autonomy.  See Buss, supra note 46, at 43–44.  Such fears are reasonable, 
given that developmental discoveries about youth immaturity have had implications beyond 
the realm of criminal sentencing.  For example, proponents and opponents of a woman’s 
ability to have an abortion have used the science.  See Scott, supra note 140, at 569–76; see 
also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing scientific 
evidence presented in the sentencing and abortion contexts).  Advocates seeking to prevent 
alcohol abuse and binge drinking among college students have likewise adopted its thrust.  
See Linda Patia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and the College Drinker: Biological Basis of 
Propensity to Use and Misuse Alcohol, COLLEGE DRINKING—CHANGING THE CULTURE (last 
reviewed Sept. 23, 2005), http://goo.gl/pTgugW. 
146 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); see also id. (“The nonavailablility of 
corrective or modifying mechanisms . . . underscore[] the need for individualized 
consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence.”). 
147 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982). 
148 Id. at 115. 
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Because they are beyond the Court’s zone of Eighth Amendment 
protection, lower courts are unwilling to entertain arguments for lessened 
culpability based on developmental differences.149 
In the noncapital punishment context, the Court has only recently 
recognized that young people’s blameworthiness must be measured with 
individualized inquiries.  Miller held that the especially harsh penalty of life 
without parole now requires individualized culpability inquiries for those 
under eighteen.150  The reasons that make life without parole especially 
harsh for those under eighteen, however, also apply to marginally older 
offenders.  Just as life without parole deprives a seventeen-year-old 
offender of “the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration,”151 
so too does it deprive an eighteen-year-old of that meaningful hope.  If it is 
true that “[m]ost fundamentally, Graham insists that youth matters in 
determining the appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the 
possibility of parole,”152 then the youthfulness of a marginally older 
offender for whom the sentence would be equally harsh must also be 
considered. 
C. UNDERMINING PENOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
Finally, the Court’s current scheme disregards the same proportional 
punishment fundamentals that it touts.  Each of the Court’s line-drawing 
decisions has highlighted how diminished culpability impairs penological 
justifications for punishment.153  While acknowledging that the Eighth 
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one particular penological 
theory, the Court has noted that a sentence must be supported by some 
justification.154  Yet, for youthful defendants’ irrevocable sentences, the 
Court has ruled out retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.  This Section addresses these justifications and describes 
 
149 See supra notes 103 and 105, and accompanying text. 
150 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
151 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
152 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465. 
153 See id. at 2465–66; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 571–72 (2005). 
154 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028.  The Graham Court noted that “[t]he concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”  Id. at 2021.  Other Justices, however, 
do not believe that the Eighth Amendment authorizes courts “to invalidate any punishment 
they deem disproportionate to the severity of the crime or to a particular class of offenders.”  
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2483 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Proportionality—the notion that the 
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of 
retribution.”); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 989 (1991). 
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why each could similarly be inapplicable to a defendant between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-five. 
1. Retribution 
In Graham and Roper, the Court considered whether retribution was a 
legitimate reason to severely punish offenders under eighteen.  Retribution, 
described as “the interest in seeing that the offender gets his ‘just 
deserts,’”155 is intimately concerned with the offender’s personal 
culpability.156  Whether retribution is viewed as a means to express 
community moral outrage or to right a victim’s wrong, the Roper Court 
noted that the case for retribution is weakened when the defendant is 
young.157  According to the Court, “[r]etribution is not proportional if the 
law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or 
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth 
and immaturity.”158  In Graham, the Court extended the same logic to 
young people sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses.159  
Retribution, the Court stated, “does not justify imposing the second most 
severe penalty on the less culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”160 
None of these considerations is unique to those under eighteen.  Young 
people aged eighteen to twenty-five can similarly have lessened moral 
culpability and blameworthiness as a result of their youth and immaturity.  
The developmental characteristics attendant to youth continue beyond the 
age of eighteen, and the normative concern for establishing an age at which 
society may reasonably demand people to be “adult” is not sacrificed by 
recognizing that some individuals have not yet attained full developmental 
maturity by that point.  Furthermore, terms of life imprisonment remain 
comparatively harsh for those just over eighteen who grow old behind bars, 
spending the prime of their lives incarcerated. 
2. Deterrence 
The Court in Roper and Graham similarly rejected deterrence as a 
justification.  Deterrence can be described as the general interest in 
preventing prospective offenders’ similar crimes.161  Outside the capital 
 
155 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
156 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (“[T]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal 
offender.” (citation omitted)). 
157 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
158 Id. 
159 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
160 Id. 
161 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
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punishment context, deterrence can also reflect the specific interest in 
preventing the particular offender from reoffending.162  For both sorts, 
“deterrence must operate (if at all) through the potential offenders’ minds, 
so it is essential that they know about the severity of the probable sentence 
[and] take this into account when deciding whether to offend . . . .”163  In 
Roper, the Court suggested that the same characteristics that make young 
offenders less culpable than adults also make them less susceptible to 
deterrence.164  In Graham, the Court further teased out this reasoning, 
stating that young people’s immaturity and impetuousness make them less 
likely to consider possible punishment when they make decisions, 
especially when that punishment is rarely imposed.165  It additionally ruled 
out any limited deterrent effect that life that without parole has on 
nonhomicide offenders, noting how any such effect is outweighed by how 
disproportionate the punishment is.166 
Again, this logic is hardly limited to offenders under eighteen.  The 
same characteristics that make those under eighteen less likely to consider 
possible punishment when they act can also be present in those aged 
eighteen to twenty-five.  If an offender cannot understand and appreciate 
the severity of an irrevocable sentence when he decides to offend, his 
sentence loses deterrent value.  While such sentences may still have some 
general deterrent value for other prospective offenders, it remains that they 
must not be grossly disproportionate to the offender against whom they are 
imposed.  Thus, depending on their crimes, some young people aged 
eighteen to twenty-five might have such diminished moral responsibility 
that any limited deterrent effect on prospective offenders that would be 
gained from the young people’s irrevocable sentences would not justify 
imposing those sentences. 
3. Incapacitation 
The Court in Graham also added and rejected the justification of 
incapacitation.  Incapacitation is said to protect the public and make 
offenders incapable of reoffending.167  The Graham Court recognized that 
incapacitation can satisfy concerns regarding public safety, but it 
determined that relating such a justification to young offenders required the 
assumption that they could be ongoing dangers.168  Because the non-fixed 
 
162 See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 79 (5th ed. 2010). 
163 Id. 
164 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–72 (2005). 
165 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–29. 
166 See id. 
167 See ASHWORTH, supra note 162, at 84. 
168 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
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nature of young people’s characters makes such an assumption 
questionable, the Court ruled out that possibility.169  Relying on Roper, it 
noted that even “expert psychologists” have trouble differentiating between 
young offenders who succumb to “unfortunate yet transient immaturity” 
and those “whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”170 
The same reasoning can make the incapacitation justification 
inapplicable to young adults.  Just as incorrigibility is inconsistent with 
youth under eighteen,171 so too might it be inconsistent with some youth 
over eighteen.  Personality disorders can generally be diagnosed in young 
people over eighteen,172 but “[u]sing a chronological age to demarcate the 
stage [in which such diagnoses are appropriate] can present difficulties as 
young people of the same chronological age may differ greatly in their 
levels of developmental maturity.”173  Research likewise shows that young 
people’s identities continue to form substantially beyond eighteen.174 
4. Rehabilitation 
Finally, the Court has concluded that a fourth goal, rehabilitation, 
could not justify irrevocable punishments for young offenders.  Although 
“the concept of rehabilitation is imprecise” and remains the subject of 
substantial dialogue,175 the rehabilitative approach generally concerns itself 
with the perceived needs of the offender rather than with the gravity of the 
crime.176  As a result, the aim is to treat the offender and provide the 
 
169 See id. 
170 Id. at 2026. 
171 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (citations omitted). 
172 BRUCE J. COHEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 504 (2003) (“Since 
children’s personalities are still subject to change at least into their young adulthoods, most 
clinicians are circumspect about diagnosing personality disorder in individuals under the age 
of 18.”). 
173 See NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY 
DISORDER: TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT 348 (2009) (discussing borderline personality 
disorder). 
174 See Waterman, supra note 51, at 355; see also Jennifer Lynn Tanner & Jeffrey Jensen 
Arnett, The Emergence of ‘Emerging Adulthood’: The New Life Stage Between Adolescence 
and Young Adulthood, in HANDBOOK OF YOUTH AND YOUNG ADULTHOOD: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES AND AGENDAS 39, 42 (Andy Furlong ed., 2009) (“Emerging adulthood is an 
age period during which there is stronger potential for personality change compared to 
earlier and later decades.”).  Tanner and Arnett note that people’s personalities over the 
period from adolescence through emerging adulthood “tend to make gains in forcefulness 
and decisiveness; . . . show increases in self-control, reflecting tendencies to become more 
reflective, deliberate and planful; and decrease in negative emotionality, including 
aggressiveness and alienation.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
175 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. 
176 See ASHWORTH, supra note 162, at 86. 
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education or skills necessary to reduce his risk of reoffending.177  In 
Graham, the Court held that life imprisonment without parole could not be 
justified by rehabilitation because “the penalty forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.”178  Denying young offenders reentry to the community, 
according to the Court, requires making permanent judgments about their 
value and place in society—inappropriate in light of young offenders’ 
“capacity for change and limited moral culpability.”179 
This justification can be also rejected on a similar basis for some 
young adults.  Those young people who have the same capacity for change 
and the same limited moral culpability as seventeen-year-olds should not be 
forsworn from potential rehabilitation simply because they are older than 
eighteen. 
Because Roper, Graham, and Miller recognized that penological goals 
cannot justify irrevocable sentences when offenders possess certain 
characteristics of youthfulness, it follows that the penological goals also 
cannot be met when other young people exhibit the same characteristics.  
Sentences prescribing death, life in prison without parole for nonhomicide 
offenses, or mandatory life in prison without parole also would be 
disproportionate for youthful offenders who are merely of a slightly higher 
age.  Punishment for both groups of offenders should be prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. 
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 To this point, this Comment has focused on illustrating the 
inadequacy of drawing a bright line at eighteen for mitigating society’s 
harshest punishments.  This Part offers a potential remedy: extending 
sentencing mitigation to those young adults under twenty-five who would 
otherwise similarly be deemed less responsible under the scheme of 
justifications the Court has set forth, absent the Court’s firm grip on 
chronological age. 
A. PRESUMPTION OF YOUTHFULNESS 
A presumption scheme would better serve criminal sentencing 
purposes, appreciating age yet refusing to be wholly bound by years and 
days.  Roper, Graham, and Miller’s bright line should be transformed into a 
scheme in which defendants under the age of eighteen are irrebuttably 
presumed to possess the youthful characteristics that mandate reduced 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, while defendants up to the age 
 
177 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. 
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of twenty-five can seek, but are not guaranteed, the same protection.  
Gradating based on age in this way imports into the modern era the early 
common law focus on punishing offenders based on the strength of their 
understanding and judgment.180 
1. Mandatory and Irrebuttable for Defendants Under Eighteen 
 Under such a remedy, sentencing for defendants who were under 
eighteen at the time of their crimes would not change.  A mandatory, 
irrebuttable presumption would still be afforded to those under eighteen so 
that they would not face society’s most severe punishments of death, life 
imprisonment for nonhomicide offenses, or mandatory life without parole. 
The costs of discontinuing this protection, as the Roper Court 
understood,181 are great.  The sentencing judge or jury, prejudiced by the 
particular crime details, could succumb to arguments contrary to 
developmental fact and find youth to be aggravating.  Even offering up the 
youthfulness factors and asking the sentencing judge or jury to apply them 
for those under eighteen on a case-by-case basis would be insufficient for 
this group, given the level of discretion incumbent in such an analysis.  
Prosecutors could appeal to the undercurrent in public consciousness that 
youthful offenders are uniquely threatening.182  They have made these 
arguments in the past, suggesting that crimes committed during youth are 
predictive of future dangerousness,183 and jurors have believed them.184 
Although some acts committed by those under eighteen are heinous 
and are “not just the acts of happy-go-lucky teenagers,” as Justice Scalia 
contended in Roper,185 the fact remains that the people who committed 
 
180 See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text.  Whereas early determinations 
focused on culpability as it related to capacity, this scheme prioritizes responsibility. 
181 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (“An unacceptable likelihood exists 
that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating 
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective 
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe 
than death.”). 
182 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age 
Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 76. 
183 See id. at 77; see also supra note 43.  Note that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in 
Roper found this tendency problematic, see 543 U.S. at 573–74, and Justice O’Connor 
deemed a prosecutor’s attempt to argue youth to be aggravating as “troubling,” id. at 603. 
184 See Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and 
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 
263, 321 & n.313 (2013) (“Surveys of jurors report that the heinousness of a crime 
invariably trumped a youth’s immaturity.”). 
185 Roper, 543 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 
2011, 2051–52 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting how the rarity of a sixteen-year-old 
sentenced to life without parole corresponded to his crime’s rare brutality). 
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those acts are still teenagers.  Given what researchers now know about 
young people, the potential split-focus between the crime’s depravity and 
the defendant’s unique sensibilities should be permanently resolved in a 
manner that concentrates on the young defendant.  Psychologists and 
scientists have found enough evidence to decisively establish that young 
people, as a class, are generally different.186  The cruelty in subjecting that 
entire class to society’s harshest punishments simply to castigate the rare, 
extraordinarily mature defendant does not warrant abrogating protection for 
those under eighteen.187  Whereas common law held that offenders younger 
than seven deserved categorical special protection,188 that age should now 
be eighteen. 
2. Permissive and Rebuttable for Defendants Up to Age Twenty-Five 
 Still, like candle flickers that outlast a birthday blow, youthfulness 
does not always disappear when an offender turns eighteen.  Youthful 
defendants up to the age of twenty-five189 should therefore have the 
opportunity to seek mitigation.  Defendants could argue that their 
youthfulness excludes society’s harshest penalties as cruel and unjust.190  
They would have to reasonably show—like the younger defendants 
protected by Roper, Graham, and Miller—that they (1) lacked maturity and 
had an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) were vulnerable to 
negative influences and had limited control over their environment, and 
(3) lacked characters that could be rehabilitated.  This showing would 
unravel the irrevocable punishments’ penological goals and preclude courts 
from imposing them under the Eighth Amendment.  Unlike mitigation for 
younger defendants, however, the burden would then shift to the 
prosecution, which could show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendants were sufficiently mature to be punished according to the 
legislature’s design.  The prosecution could undermine the defendants’ 
evidence or introduce new evidence showcasing the offenders’ culpability, 
not the crimes’ grievousness. 
A preponderance of the evidence standard, and not beyond a 
reasonable doubt, would be the appropriate burden for prosecutors to meet 
in disclaiming an eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old defendant’s assertion of 
 
186 See supra Part I.B. 
187 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73. 
188 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
189 For a discussion about the endpoint of twenty-five, see infra Part III.B.1. 
190 Due to its potential impact on plea bargaining, any determination regarding a 
defendant’s eligibility for irrevocable punishments should precede the guilt phase of a trial. 
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youthfulness.191  It would harmonize the interests in respecting legislative 
determinations of appropriate punishment while avoiding punishing 
legitimately youthful offenders unjustifiably.  It would further retain some 
of the value in criminal law, not just as a reflector of actual human 
behavior, but also as a system of rules that suggests its ideal, aspirational 
expression.  Criminal law, after all, not only censures; in so doing, it 
bestows positive, societal norms.  If prosecutors could prove that a 
defendant, more likely than not, actually did not possess the characteristics 
that warrant mitigation, then the full spectrum of legislatively prescribed 
sentences would be available.  But if prosecutors failed to contradict a 
youthfulness showing, more likely than not, then they could not subject the 
defendant to the harshest penalties.  The court would determine both 
whether the defendant reasonably demonstrated his youthfulness and 
whether the prosecution rebutted the defendant’s showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Such a permissive, rebuttable youthfulness presumption would 
certainly alter schemes presuming criminal defendants to have the requisite 
responsibility to be held culpable.  It might likewise raise uncertainties 
about the legal dichotomy between juvenile and criminal courts for older 
offenders.  But, without requiring legislators to overhaul penal codes, this 
proposal would effectuate the meaning of Roper, Graham, and Miller. 
B. ADDRESSING CONCERNS 
With the contours of this remedy established, a number of questions 
emerge.  For example, why should the presumption be limited to those 
under the age of twenty-five?  Would imposing the presumption 
unnecessarily burden courts?  Additionally, would allowing this level of 
judicial discretion invite uncertainty and unwarranted inconsistency?  The 
following Sections address these issues. 
1. Simply a Delayed Bright Line? 
The first and most obvious critique of this remedy is the way it 
advocates a solution it seemingly opposes: drawing a somewhat arbitrary, 
albeit delayed, bright line.  Drawing a line at twenty-five, however, is more 
 
191 Before Roper, Graham, and Miller, Professor Stephen Morse discussed a similar 
rebuttable presumption scheme but suggested that “[f]airness and efficiency should require 
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular adolescent was fully 
responsible.”  Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 63 (1997).  He contended that such a high burden was necessary for cases 
involving defendants on the margin “in a system that prefers incorrect attributions of 
innocence (or lesser culpability) to incorrect attributions of guilt (or greater culpability).”  Id. 
at 63–64. 
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appropriate than eighteen for several reasons.  To be sure, a line at twenty-
five comes closer to the science the Court touts.  Recall that neuroscientific 
evidence previously before the Court proved that a youth’s brain is not fully 
mature until an individual’s twenties.192  More recent sociological and 
psychological evidence continues to support such a finding.193  For 
example, as a result of mounting evidence, child psychologists in Britain 
issued new guidelines in September 2013 “directing clinicians to reconsider 
how they view patients in younger adulthood” and treat those up to age 
twenty-five.194  A line at twenty-five would also better heed the Court’s 
concerns regarding the impact of youthfulness on retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.195  As previously demonstrated, courts 
risk imposing unjust, unequal punishment when marginally older 
defendants can be censured more harshly than their younger counterparts, 
even though both groups possess the same culpability-reducing traits. 
Drawing a line at twenty-five, and not some later age, additionally 
retains the Court’s focus on the particular disproportionality of life 
imprisonment without parole for younger defendants.  As the Graham 
Court recognized, “[l]ife without parole is an especially harsh punishment 
for a juvenile.  Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve 
more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult.”196  
This sentiment rings true for those defendants marginally older than 
eighteen.  If a defendant is older than twenty-five, however, the validity of 
youth-based rebuttals to life imprisonment diminish.  Indeed, if defendants 
are not fully developed by age twenty-five, their available recourse should 
perhaps not be a youthfulness presumption.  It could be a developmental 
disability defense.197 
 
192 See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
194 Matthew Mientka, Adulthood Extended to Age 25 by Child Psychologists in UK, 
MEDICAL DAILY (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://goo.gl/8JDJCf; see also Lucy Wallis, Is 25 
the New Cut-Off Point for Adulthood?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2013, 5:52 PM), 
http://goo.gl/ZRQ9ZV. 
195 See supra Part II.C. 
196 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
197 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (“[C]linical definitions of mental 
retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant 
limitations in adaptive skills . . . .  Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference 
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.  Because of their impairments, 
however, by definition they have diminished capacities . . . .”).  The differences between a 
developmental disability defense and a youthfulness presumption are much starker than the 
ages for which they are applicable: the former reflects a defendant’s diminished culpability 
as a result of transitory qualities.  The latter reflects both a defendant’s permanent 
diminished capacity and his resulting diminished culpability. 
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2. Sacrificing Judicial Efficiency? 
A second critique of the presumption remedy is the burden it would 
impose on courts, requiring them to evaluate a new class of defendants’ 
youthfulness, case-by-case.  Evaluating a defendant’s youthfulness, 
however, is already mandated for society’s harshest penalties under the 
Eighth Amendment.  Eddings required courts to consider youthfulness 
before they could impose capital punishment.198  Miller required courts to 
similarly consider youthfulness when defendants under eighteen face life 
imprisonment without parole.199  Where Eddings additionally stated that 
“youth is more than a chronological fact,”200 this Comment’s presumption 
scheme would ensure that youth amounts to more than a chronological fact 
in those situations where life imprisonment amounts to capital 
punishment.201  In this way, the presumption scheme closes the Eighth 
Amendment loop fashioned from conjunctive readings of Eddings, Roper, 
Graham, and Miller. 
Even if Eighth Amendment case law does not require this youthfulness 
inquiry, the interest in fair, proportional sentences demands it and offsets 
any added judicial burden.  Outside the sentencing context, such 
individualized determinations often would be irrational.  For example, 
requiring courts to decide whether every seventeen-year-old is mature 
enough to vote would “greatly outweigh whatever injustice might be 
produced by the use of a bright line minimum voting age.”202  When 
unjustified punishment is the countervailing injustice, however, the interest 
in judicial efficiency hardly compares.203  Indeed, the injustice that stems 
from sentencing equally youthful defendants to significantly harsher 
punishments must require individualized youthfulness determinations—in 
spite of efficiency interests.204  The Supreme Court has held that 
 
198 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982). 
199 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
200 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115. 
201 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
202 See Hoffmann, supra note 106, at 281–82.  See generally supra Part II.B.  
203 While police procedure and criminal sentencing are imperfect analogs, the Court in 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina recognized the need to carve out age as an exception to an 
otherwise objective Miranda rule.  131 S. Ct. 2394, 2407 (2011).  In response to the State’s 
argument that a child’s age must be excluded from the custody analysis “to preserve clarity,” 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the Court has rejected a “more easily administered line, 
recognizing that it would simply enable the police to circumvent the constraints on custodial 
interrogations established by Miranda.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
In the sentencing context, however, the Court’s bright line at age eighteen arguably enables 
some judges and juries to circumvent Eighth Amendment constraints on punishment. 
204 Commentators such as Professor Feld have previously recognized the burden that 
mitigating sentences based on youth might impose on courts.  See, e.g., Feld, supra note 23, 
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youthfulness diminishes culpability.  Imposing fair, proportional 
punishment requires the same youthfulness consideration for defendants 
who are merely days or years older. 
3. Inviting Uncertainty and Unwarranted Sentencing Inconsistency? 
Finally, this remedy can be criticized for inviting uncertainty and 
unwarranted sentencing inconsistencies for defendants aged eighteen to 
twenty-five.  Thankfully, however, the Court has provided lower courts 
with a sufficient framework that can permit individualized sentencing and 
avoid unfair disparities.205  In Roper, Graham, and Miller, the Court offered 
and strengthened three factors that make youth less culpable under the 
Eighth Amendment.206  In so doing, the Court provided a guide for lower 
courts evaluating whether defendants between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five warrant youthfulness presumptions. The youthfulness cases 
encourage lower courts to consider evidence of an offender’s (1) lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) vulnerability to 
negative influences and limited control over their environment, and (3) lack 
of characters that can be rehabilitated. 
Sentencing judges or juries in both state and federal courts could rely 
on these factors similarly to how federal district courts use Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The advisory Guidelines create a baseline for 
sentencing without sacrificing judicial fact-finding.207  The youthfulness 
factors could likewise provide a consistent baseline for addressing eighteen- 
to twenty-five-year-olds’ youthfulness claims. When courts address 
offender characteristics “in a reasonably consistent manner,” according to 
 
at 122 (“[F]or ease of administration, age alone provides the most useful criterion upon 
which to allocate mitigation”).  In part for this reason, Professor Feld has proposed a “youth 
discount” in which sentences would be reduced according to age.  Id. at 122–23; see also 
Feld, supra note 184, at 325–27 & n.328 (describing supporters of the “youth discount” 
principle).  Professor Feld has argued that his approach “avoids the conceptual and 
administrative difficulties of a more encompassing subjective inquiry.”  Feld, supra note 23, 
at 122.  This Comment rejects Professor Feld’s age-based approach, siding instead with 
reasoning offered by Professor Morse, who asked, “Should not efficiency yield to the need to 
individualize for the small class of adults with the same characteristics as juveniles who 
therefore might not be responsible?”  Morse, supra note 191, at 64; see also id. at 59 (“[W]e 
must very carefully identify why adolescents might be treated differently, and if fairness 
requires differential treatment for the class, it also requires that adults with the same 
responsibility diminishing characteristics should be treated equally.”). 
205 This Comment asserts that the Court has identified relevant factors for subsequent 
courts to consider when evaluating the blameworthiness of young adults.  But see Feld, 
supra note 184, at 321–22. 
206 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)). 
207 See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
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the Guidelines, they “help secure nationwide consistency, avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities, provide certainty and fairness, and 
promote respect for the law.”208 
Moreover, the case law understanding of youthfulness actually 
constrains federal judicial discretion to a greater degree than the Sentencing 
Commission envisioned.  The Guidelines’ section on age provides that 
“[a]ge (including youth) may be relevant in determining whether a 
departure is warranted, if considerations based on age, individually or in 
combination with other offender characteristics, are present to an unusual 
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the 
guidelines.”209  If judges track Eighth Amendment case law to define 
“youth,” they would have even more characteristics to study. 
Across courts, this expanded inquiry regarding youthfulness could 
curtail discretion and inconsistency, and the Guidelines’ nondescript 
“youth” could be given new meaning for defendants under twenty-five 
facing capital punishment or life imprisonment for nonhomicide crimes.  
Although this Comment does not define the factors’ exact application, the 
Court has not otherwise required detailed remedies.  For example, the Court 
has left for states to determine the appropriate ways to enforce 
constitutional restrictions against executing both mentally retarded and 
insane individuals.210  This presumption remedy simply gives courts new 
lenses through which to view evidence that many already are required to 
gather. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has demonstrated three reasons why the current 
approach of recognizing the mitigating effect of youthfulness only when 
defendants are under eighteen years old cannot stand.  If the solution to 
address the increasingly punitive orientation of criminal justice remains one 
of protecting youthful defendants through the Eighth Amendment, then 
courts must also consider defendants’ youthfulness when eighteen- to 
twenty-five-year-olds face irrevocable sentences.  Because the Court 
continues to insist that developmental differences lessen culpability and 
negate all penological justifications for imposing society’s harshest 
 
208 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2012) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted), available at http://goo.gl/cyilMw. 
209 Id. § 5H1.1. 
210 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)).  For a discussion about how the Court’s approach has 
resulted in a myriad of procedures, see Allison Freedman, Note, Mental Retardation and the 
Death Penalty: The Need for an International Standard Defining Mental Retardation, 12 
NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 8–9 (2014). 
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sanctions, marginally older and equally blameless offenders must be able to 
seek the same protection from them.  A permissive, rebuttable presumption 
of youthfulness would accomplish this goal.  Indeed, as the Court has 
suggested, “making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant” to the 
imposition of the harshest and irrevocable sentences “poses too great a risk 
of disproportionate punishment.”211 
 
 
211 See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. 
